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cross_type 2.00 — strongly supporting 3 facts

Graham is a key theorist who provides a formal definition of testimony in [1], illustrates the mechanics of testimonial belief through specific cases in [2], and engages in philosophical debates regarding the justification of testimony in [3].

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Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2 facts

accountIn a case discussed by Graham (2000b), a testifier (T) cannot distinguish between two twins (A and B), but the hearer (S) knows that twin B could not have knocked over a vase; therefore, when the testifier claims twin A knocked over the vase, the hearer's belief is sustained by the hearer's independent knowledge that twin B did not do it.

claimLiberals such as Graham and Plantinga argue that the possibility of interpreting testimonial utterances does not necessarily justify belief in the reliability of testimony, challenging Coady’s Davidsonian argument.

Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 fact

procedureGraham (1997) defines testimony as: S testifies that p if and only if (i) S's stating that p is offered as evidence that p, (ii) S intends that his audience believe that he has the relevant competence, authority, or credentials to state truly that p, and (iii) S's statement that p is believed by S to be relevant to some question that he believes is disputed or unresolved and is directed at those whom he believes to be in need of evidence on the matter.