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Testimony and memory are frequently compared as fundamental epistemic sources for knowledge acquisition and justification, as seen in [1], [2], and [3]. Philosophers often draw an analogy between the two, arguing for their epistemic parity [4], [5], and [6], or exploring how testimony can be structurally reduced to or modeled after memory [7], [8], and [9].
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Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 21 facts
quoteJennifer Lackey (2005) states: “non–reductionists maintain that testimony is just as basic a source of justification (knowledge, warrant, entitlement, and so forth) as sense-perception, memory, inference, and the like”.
perspectiveGreen argues that epistemic parity between testimony, memory, and perception is a more economical and likely true account of epistemic phenomena than accounts that distinguish sharply between the three sources.
claimThe 'reactionary' epistemic position accepts only principles regarding a priori insight, internal experiences, and deduction, while rejecting principles related to memory, enumerative induction, inference to the best explanation, perception, and testimony.
claimChristopher Green argues that if memory is treated as the interpretation of a message from an earlier time slice of oneself, then memorially-based beliefs are transformed into testimonially-based beliefs, and this transformation should not create or preserve epistemic status or affect the structure of its explanation.
claimChristopher Green argues that testimony and memory are on an epistemic par.
claimTurning memorially-based beliefs into testimonially-based beliefs requires treating the believer at one time as a different person from the believer at a later time.
claimWhile some philosophers require positive reasons to believe in the reliability of a testifier, most do not insist that a subject must have a sufficiently large inductive base to justify an inference from other beliefs or reduce testimony to perception, memory, or inference.
procedureChristopher Green proposes transforming testimonially-based beliefs into memorially-based beliefs by applying the legal fiction of agency, 'qui facit per alium, facit per se' ('he who acts through another, acts himself'), treating the testifier as the believer's epistemic agent.
claimPeter Graham defines a "reactionary" as someone who accepts only principles of a priori insight, internal experiences, and deduction, while rejecting principles related to memory, enumerative induction, inference to the best explanation, perception, and testimony.
claimMichael Dummett (1994) suggests that knowledge-preservationism aligns best with a less demanding approach to epistemology by drawing a strong analogy between testimony and memory.
quotePeter Graham (2004) states: “The central claim the Anti-Reductionist makes is that the epistemologies of perception, memory, and testimony should all look more or less alike.”
claimRichard Foley argues that trust in others, which is central to testimony, is no less justified than trust in oneself, which is central to memory.
perspectiveReductionism views testimony as akin to inference and places a relatively heavy burden on the recipient of testimony, whereas anti-reductionism views testimony as akin to perception or memory and places a relatively light burden on the recipient.
claimMichael Dummett suggests that both memory and testimony are merely means of preserving or transmitting knowledge rather than creating it, and that both are direct and do not require supporting beliefs.
claimGreen argues that the epistemic parity of testimony, memory, and perception follows from the epistemic innocence of transformations that turn instances of testimonially-based beliefs into instances of beliefs based on the other two sources, preserving the structure of the explanation of epistemic status.
quoteRobert Audi states: "[W]e cannot test the reliability of one of these basic sources [that is, for Audi, a source like perception or memory, but not testimony] or even confirm an instance of it without relying on that very source. … With testimony, one can, in principle, check reliability using any of the standard basic sources."
quoteGalen Strawson (1994) suggests that testimony as a source of belief requires other sources like perception, stating: "[T]he employment of perception and memory is a necessary condition of the acquisition and retention of any knowledge (or belief) which is communicated linguistically…"
claimBeliefs can be categorized based on their source or root, such as perceptual, deductive, inductive, memorial, or testimonial.
claimGreen (2006) excludes beliefs that cannot be perceptually-based, such as mathematical facts, from his argument regarding the epistemic parity of testimony, memory, and perception.
claimBeliefs can be based on multiple sources simultaneously, such as being partly testimonially-based and partly perceptually-based, or partly inductively-based and partly memorially-based.
claimIf a testifier's actions are treated as the believer's own actions, the transfer of information from testifier to believer is structurally equivalent to the transfer of information from a person at one time to themselves at a later time via memory.
Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu 4 facts
referenceDavid Christensen and Hilary Kornblith published the paper 'Testimony, Memory, and the Limits of the A Priori' in the journal Philosophical Studies in 1997.
claimA primary motivation for the Transmission View is the analogy between memory and testimony, which suggests that just as one cannot acquire memorial knowledge of a proposition today without having known it previously, one cannot acquire testimonial knowledge of a proposition from a speaker who does not know it themselves.
referenceMichael Dummett published the paper 'Testimony and Memory' in 1994.
claimEpistemologists debate whether testimony is a basic source of justification or if it can be reduced to other epistemic sources like perception, memory, and inference.
Social Epistemology – Introduction to Philosophy - Rebus Press press.rebus.community 3 facts
claimTestimonial reductionism asserts that individuals are justified in believing testimony only if they possess testimony-independent evidence, such as sensation, introspection, or memories of sensation or introspection, to support that belief.
claimTestimonial justification reduces to other forms of justification, such as observation and memory, because testimony is only considered evidence when supported by inductive evidence.
claimNon-reductionism faces a phenomenalistic problem because, unlike other sources of justification such as perception, introspection, memory, or intuition, testimony does not inherently present itself as true.
Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 3 facts
claimReliabilism identifies sources of belief formation such as sense experience, reason, testimony, and memory, and emphasizes the cognitive process that leads to a belief's formation.
claimReliabilism evaluates beliefs by identifying the specific cognitive process that led to their formation, such as the specific sense used, the source of testimony, the type of reasoning, or the recency of a memory.
claimReliabilism, a prominent version of externalism, suggests that the justification of a belief depends on the source of that belief, such as sense experience, reason, testimony, or memory.
Epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 2 facts
claimEpistemologists investigate sources of justification, including perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony, to discover how knowledge arises.
claimSources of justification are cognitive capacities or methods through which people acquire justification, with commonly discussed sources including perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony.
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 2 facts
claimFor true beliefs to qualify as knowledge, they must originate from sources considered reliable, which include perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony.
claimFor a belief to qualify as knowledge, it must originate from sources considered reliable, such as perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony, rather than psychological factors like desires, emotional needs, prejudice, or biases.
Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimReductionism in epistemology is the view that the justification of beliefs derived from testimony can be reduced to justifications provided by other sources such as perception, memory, and induction.