Knowledge Tree
Relations (1)
cross_type 0.80 — strongly supporting 8 facts
Green is the author who develops a philosophical argument regarding the epistemic parity of testimony compared to memory and perception [1], [2]. His work explores the structural similarities between these sources [3], [4], [5] and defines the roles of testifiers and recipients within the framework of testimony [6], [7].
Facts (8)
Sources
Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 8 facts
perspectiveGreen argues that epistemic parity between testimony, memory, and perception is a more economical and likely true account of epistemic phenomena than accounts that distinguish sharply between the three sources.
claimGreen (2006) discusses a scenario where a testifier (T) and a hearer (S) conceptualize the object of a belief differently, such as when T tells S that object m is F, without knowing that m is the same as object n, while S knows that m is n.
perspectiveGreen (2006) argues that it is unclear whether testimony is fundamentally different from perception regarding the necessity of higher-order beliefs about the source.
claimGreen (2006) suggests that a testifier acts as an epistemic agent or employee for the recipient, where the testifier takes responsibility for specific areas of epistemic business, while the recipient retains the responsibility to select the testifier properly.
claimGreen suggests that transforming perceptually-based beliefs into testimonially-based beliefs involves anthropomorphizing sense faculties by imagining a world where sense faculties are operated by individuals who present messages about the environment, resulting in the same structure of explanation for epistemic status.
claimGreen argues that the epistemic parity of testimony, memory, and perception follows from the epistemic innocence of transformations that turn instances of testimonially-based beliefs into instances of beliefs based on the other two sources, preserving the structure of the explanation of epistemic status.
perspectiveGreen argues that it is not clear that testimony is fundamentally different from perception regarding the necessity of holding higher-order beliefs about the source of the information.
claimGreen (2006) excludes beliefs that cannot be perceptually-based, such as mathematical facts, from his argument regarding the epistemic parity of testimony, memory, and perception.