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The 'explanatory gap' is a philosophical concept specifically defined as the challenge of explaining the relationship between physical processes and consciousness, as noted in [1], [2], and [3]. Philosophers like David Chalmers and Joseph Levine utilize this gap to describe the difficulty of bridging the divide between physical accounts and phenomenal consciousness, as detailed in [4], [5], and [6].
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Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 6 facts
claimDavid Chalmers argues that the explanatory gap between physical facts and facts about consciousness is expected once fundamental psychophysical laws are introduced into our picture of nature.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that the explanatory gap regarding consciousness is analogous to the explanatory gaps found in causal nexi, though humans are less accustomed to the former.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that the explanatory gap regarding consciousness should not be viewed as a unique mystery, but rather as a type of gap that is ubiquitous in science and fundamental physics.
claimColin McGinn proposes that the explanatory gap between physical facts and consciousness arises from human cognitive limitations, which prevent us from grasping the conceptual implication from physical facts to facts about consciousness.
claimDavid Chalmers posits that if Price's analogy is correct, the explanatory gap between the brain and consciousness arises from contingency in connecting principles caused by brutely contingent fundamental laws.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that the explanatory gap regarding consciousness does not depend on ontological assumptions, but rather on the conceptual distinction between structural/functional concepts and consciousness.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 3 facts
claimThe explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal accounts of consciousness has been a topic of discussion in the mind-body problem for centuries.
claimThe arguments regarding the irreducibility of consciousness postulate an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal accounts, implying an ontological distinction between phenomenal and physical properties.
claimGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's "mills argument" is historically one of the earliest and most prominent observations regarding the explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal accounts of consciousness.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 3 facts
claimJoseph Levine argues that thought experiments demonstrate an explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical world, asserting that even if consciousness is reducible to physical things, it cannot be explained in terms of physical things because the link between them is contingent.
perspectiveJoseph Levine considers the possibility that the explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical world is merely an epistemological problem for physicalism, rather than evidence that consciousness is non-physical.
claimIn 1983, philosopher Joseph Levine proposed that there is an explanatory gap between the understanding of the physical world and the understanding of consciousness.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 2 facts
claimThe 'hard problem of consciousness' is defined as the challenge of closing the 'explanatory gap' between consciousness and the physical.
perspectiveJoseph Levine asserts that consciousness presents an explanatory gap because, even with a complete specification of brain mechanisms and physical laws, it remains an open question whether consciousness is present.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers refers to the difficulty of explaining consciousness as the 'hard problem of consciousness,' which is also known as the 'explanatory gap' or the 'generation problem'.
The development of consciousness from an evolutionary perspective academia.edu 1 fact
perspectiveThe 'explanatory gap' regarding consciousness is illusory because both first-person and third-person ontologies refer to the same physical state.
Theories and Methods of Consciousness biomedres.us 1 fact
quote“The three kinds of evidence are also consistent with the brain as being a receiver of external consciousness information,” which eliminates the explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness.