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cross_type 0.90 — strongly supporting 9 facts
Joseph Levine is related to the concept of consciousness through his extensive philosophical contributions, including proposing the explanatory gap between physical processes and conscious experience [1], arguing that higher-order theories fail to explain it [2], and critiquing functionalism as inadequate for consciousness [3].
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Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 4 facts
claimDavid Chalmers, Joseph Levine, and Saul Kripke argue that philosophical zombies are impossible within the bounds of nature but possible within the bounds of logic, implying that facts about experience are not logically entailed by physical facts and that consciousness is irreducible.
claimJoseph Levine argues that thought experiments demonstrate an explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical world, asserting that even if consciousness is reducible to physical things, it cannot be explained in terms of physical things because the link between them is contingent.
perspectiveJoseph Levine considers the possibility that the explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical world is merely an epistemological problem for physicalism, rather than evidence that consciousness is non-physical.
claimIn 1983, philosopher Joseph Levine proposed that there is an explanatory gap between the understanding of the physical world and the understanding of consciousness.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 2 facts
perspectiveJoseph Levine asserts that consciousness presents an explanatory gap because, even with a complete specification of brain mechanisms and physical laws, it remains an open question whether consciousness is present.
referenceJoseph Levine authored 'On Leaving out what it’s like', published in the 1993 collection 'Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays' edited by M. Davies and G. Humphreys.
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimJoseph Levine (2006) and Uriah Kriegel (2012) argue that no form of higher-order theory has the necessary resources to explain consciousness.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
perspectiveCritics of functionalism, including Ned Block (1980a, 1980b), Joseph Levine (1983), and David Chalmers (1996), argue that consciousness cannot be adequately explained solely in functional terms.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org 1 fact
claimJoseph Levine and Galen Strawson have made considerations similar to David Chalmers regarding the inability of standard scientific methods to fully explain consciousness.