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Consciousness is a central subject of debate within ontology, as philosophers like Galen Strawson argue for its inclusion in fundamental reality [1], while others like Georges Rey suggest it may be excluded from a scientific ontology [2]. Additionally, non-reductive physicalism specifically addresses the ontological status of consciousness as a physical yet irreducible property [3].

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Sources
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 fact
referenceGeorges Rey argued in 1997 that the term 'consciousness' may serve no use in scientific theory and could be dropped from a scientifically-fixed ontology.
Non-Reductive Physicalism - Theories of Consciousness theoriesofconsciousness.com Theories of Consciousness 1 fact
perspectiveNon-reductive physicalism is a philosophy of mind position that asserts consciousness is entirely physical in its ontology, yet mental properties are not reducible to physical properties and require their own level of explanation.