Knowledge Tree
Relations (1)
cross_type 2.32 — strongly supporting 4 facts
Green is the author who proposes the theory of epistemic parity between testimony, perception, and memory [1], [2]. He specifically explores the functional equivalence between testimony and memory by comparing the transfer of information across time to the transfer of information between individuals [3], while noting specific exclusions for non-perceptual beliefs like mathematics [4].
Facts (4)
Sources
Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 4 facts
perspectiveGreen argues that epistemic parity between testimony, memory, and perception is a more economical and likely true account of epistemic phenomena than accounts that distinguish sharply between the three sources.
claimGreen claims that treating a testifier's earlier actions as the subject's own actions makes the transfer of information from a testifier to a subject equivalent to the transfer of information from a subject at one time to the same subject at a later time via memory.
claimGreen argues that the epistemic parity of testimony, memory, and perception follows from the epistemic innocence of transformations that turn instances of testimonially-based beliefs into instances of beliefs based on the other two sources, preserving the structure of the explanation of epistemic status.
claimGreen (2006) excludes beliefs that cannot be perceptually-based, such as mathematical facts, from his argument regarding the epistemic parity of testimony, memory, and perception.