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The 'Intrinsic Nature Argument' is a primary philosophical framework used to support and defend the theory of panpsychism, as evidenced by its role in addressing explanatory gaps in physicalism [1], [2]. It posits that because physics only describes the extrinsic properties of matter, the intrinsic nature of matter must be mental or experiential, thereby providing a foundational argument for panpsychism [3], [4], [5].
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Critique of Panpsychism: Philosophical Coherence and Scientific ... thequran.love 7 facts
claimThe intrinsic nature argument for panpsychism posits that because brains have an intrinsic character of consciousness, it is possible that all matter shares this intrinsic conscious nature.
claimCritics argue that the intrinsic nature argument does not necessarily establish full-blown panpsychism, as it is possible that only specific complex systems, such as living cells or certain quantum systems, possess an intrinsic experiential aspect.
claimThe intrinsic nature argument asserts that panpsychism provides a satisfying answer to the gap in the scientific worldview where physics describes matter only in terms of structure, relations, and behavior, but fails to describe what matter is like in itself.
claimThe intrinsic nature argument for panpsychism posits that because physical science only describes extrinsic properties of matter, and because conscious experience is the only known intrinsic property, it is hypothesized that the intrinsic nature of matter is mental or proto-mental.
claimThe intrinsic nature argument serves as a positive case for the plausibility of panpsychism by addressing an explanatory lacuna in standard physicalism.
claimThe intrinsic nature argument for panpsychism is based on the epistemic gap between the extrinsic, relational properties of matter described by science and the unknown intrinsic nature of matter.
referenceThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on 'Panpsychism' provides a comprehensive overview of the concept, including the intrinsic nature argument, objections such as the 'incredulous stare,' and the combination problem along with its responses.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu 5 facts
referenceTimothy Sprigge provides a defense of the intrinsic nature argument for panpsychism within an extended discussion of the virtues of panpsychism.
claimGalen Strawson's general argument for panpsychism is a version of the intrinsic nature argument, which is akin to Russellian neutral monism, with the distinction that the substrate is explicitly taken to be experiential in nature rather than metaphysically neutral.
claimBecause the only intrinsic nature humans are familiar with is consciousness, and matter must be assigned some intrinsic nature, the intrinsic nature argument suggests that matter must be granted a mentalistic intrinsic nature.
claimThe intrinsic nature argument for panpsychism posits that every actual thing must possess an intrinsic nature, and since physics describes objects in purely dispositional terms (such as an electron's spin), these dispositions must be grounded in non-dispositional attributes.
claimMichael Lockwood developed a version of panpsychism that combines quantum mechanical considerations with the intrinsic nature argument, endorsing the view that the world is a sum of perspectives.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 3 facts
claimThe 'Intrinsic Nature Argument' for panpsychism has historical roots in the works of Leibniz, Schopenhauer, Bertrand Russell (1927), and Alfred North Whitehead (1933 [1967]), and is supported by contemporary philosophers including T.L.S. Sprigge (1999), Galen Strawson (2003), and Philip Goff (2017).
claimThe 'Intrinsic Nature Argument' for panpsychism posits that there is a gap in the picture of the world provided by the physical sciences.
claimThe 'Intrinsic Nature Argument' for panpsychism is closely connected to the motivations behind Russellian monism.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 Edition) plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimThe intrinsic nature argument for panpsychism is defended by philosophers including Michael Lockwood Sprigge (1999), Galen Strawson (2003), and Philip Goff (2017).