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cross_type 3.00 — strongly supporting 7 facts
Thomas Nagel is fundamentally linked to the concept of qualia through his seminal 1974 paper, which introduced the 'what it is like' framework to describe subjective experience [1]. His work is widely cited as the basis for defining qualia as the qualitative feel of consciousness {fact:1, fact:2, fact:7}, and he remains a central figure in philosophical debates regarding the nature of these subjective states {fact:5, fact:6}.
Facts (7)
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A harder problem of consciousness: reflections on a 50-year quest ... frontiersin.org 2 facts
referenceThomas Nagel (1974) identified that discussions on consciousness have traditionally focused on the emergence of qualia within the brain's neural architecture, a phenomenon often referred to as the alchemy of qualia.
claimThomas Nagel introduced the concept of qualia into mainstream philosophical discourse in his 1974 paper, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?', which articulated the difficulty of explaining subjective experience in objective terms.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
quote“We can say that a being is conscious if there is something it is like to be that being, to use a phrase made famous by Thomas Nagel. Similarly, a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel—an associated quality of experience. These qualitative feels are also known as phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short. The problem of explaining these phenomenal qualities is just the problem of explaining consciousness. This is the really hard part of the mind–body problem”
Consciousness and Cognitive Sciences journal-psychoanalysis.eu 1 fact
claimThomas Nagel's expression 'what it is like to be' is widely accepted in the literature as capturing the essential nature of subjectivity, consciousness, qualia, and experience.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
perspectiveSome philosophers, such as Nagel (1974) and Chalmers (1996), argue that qualitative consciousness—the 'what it is like' aspect—is philosophically and scientifically central, and that organisms lacking such qualia may only be conscious in a loose or non-literal sense.
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence? A Framework for Classifying ... arxiv.org 1 fact
claimThe authors of 'Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence? A Framework for Classifying Objections and Constraints' define consciousness as phenomenal consciousness, which Thomas Nagel described as the fact of there being 'something it is like' to be a system, involving qualia or subjective experience.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
perspectiveWolfgang Fasching argues that the hard problem of consciousness is not about qualia, but about the 'what-it-is-like-ness' of experience in Thomas Nagel's sense, specifically the givenness of phenomenal contents.