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cross_type 4.00 — strongly supporting 15 facts
Thomas Nagel is a central figure in the philosophy of mind who famously defined consciousness through his 'what it is like to be' framework {fact:2, fact:11, fact:12}. He has extensively analyzed the relationship between consciousness and the physical world, arguing that consciousness is irreducible to physical properties {fact:4, fact:13, fact:15} and identifying it as the core difficulty of the mind-body problem [1].
Facts (15)
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Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org 4 facts
claimThomas Nagel (1979) discusses but ultimately rejects the weak version of the argument from non-emergence, viewing the pan(proto)psychist conclusion as too implausible, despite being unable to identify the specific flaw in the argument.
claimThomas Nagel and Galen Strawson argue that consciousness cannot be constituted by the physical due to the epistemic gap or related considerations.
claimThomas Nagel and Galen Strawson argue that if consciousness emerges from the physical, it must occur through causal production or a dualist psychophysical law, but they reject this possibility by invoking the interaction problem, which posits that such causal relations are unintelligible and impossible.
perspectiveThomas Nagel claims that it is unintelligible how any physical process can necessitate consciousness, asserting that causation must involve necessitation rather than effects merely following causes.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 2 facts
quote“We can say that a being is conscious if there is something it is like to be that being, to use a phrase made famous by Thomas Nagel. Similarly, a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel—an associated quality of experience. These qualitative feels are also known as phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short. The problem of explaining these phenomenal qualities is just the problem of explaining consciousness. This is the really hard part of the mind–body problem”
claimDavid Chalmers defines a being as conscious if there is "something it is like to be that being," a phrase attributed to Thomas Nagel.
David Chalmers Thinks the Hard Problem Is Really Hard scientificamerican.com 1 fact
claimThomas Nagel asserted in his 1974 essay 'What is it like to be a bat?' that consciousness is the specific factor that makes the mind-body problem difficult.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 1 fact
claimThomas Nagel suggested that the structural properties of experience, such as the geometric structure of a visual field, might be the most amenable aspects of consciousness to formal expression.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers defines consciousness using Thomas Nagel's concept of 'the feeling of what it is like to be something,' treating consciousness as synonymous with experience.
A harder problem of consciousness: reflections on a 50-year quest ... frontiersin.org 1 fact
referenceThomas Nagel (1974) identified that discussions on consciousness have traditionally focused on the emergence of qualia within the brain's neural architecture, a phenomenon often referred to as the alchemy of qualia.
Consciousness and Cognitive Sciences journal-psychoanalysis.eu 1 fact
claimThomas Nagel's expression 'what it is like to be' is widely accepted in the literature as capturing the essential nature of subjectivity, consciousness, qualia, and experience.
Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
referenceIn the book 'Mortal Questions' (1979), Thomas Nagel argues that panpsychism follows from four premises: (P1) everything that exists is material, (P2) consciousness is irreducible to lower-level physical properties, (P3) consciousness exists, and (P4) higher-order properties of matter can be reduced to lower-level properties.
The Conscious Mind - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimThomas Nagel's essay 'What is it Like to be a Bat?' posits that a bat is conscious if it feels like something to be a bat.
AI Sessions #9: The Case Against AI Consciousness (with Anil Seth) conspicuouscognition.com 1 fact
quoteThomas Nagel defined consciousness as the state where "for a conscious organism, there is something it is like to be that organism."
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimRoger Penrose (1989), John Searle (1991), Thomas Nagel (1979, 1986, 1999), and Noam Chomsky (1999) have all endorsed, suggested, or hinted at the idea that the problem of consciousness may necessitate a revolutionary change in physics.