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Relations (1)
cross_type 2.32 — strongly supporting 4 facts
Thomas Nagel is directly linked to the concept of mental states through his philosophical work, where he defines them as conscious experiences characterized by a qualitative feel [1], [2]. Furthermore, Nagel argues that mental states are genuine properties of living organisms [3] and posits that they must arise from non-physical properties of basic matter [4].
Facts (4)
Sources
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 2 facts
perspectiveThomas Nagel concludes that there must be non-physical properties of basic matter that, when combined, intelligibly imply the existence of mental states.
claimThomas Nagel's argument for panpsychism relies on four premises: Material Composition (living organisms are complex material systems with no immaterial parts), Realism (mental states are genuine properties of living organisms), No Radical Emergence (all properties of a complex organism are intelligibly derived from the properties of its parts), and Non-Reductionism (mental states are not intelligibly derived from physical properties alone).
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimThomas Nagel (1974) defines a conscious creature as one where a mental state is conscious if there is something that it is like to be in that state, providing a first-person or internal conception of phenomenal or qualitative states.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
quote“We can say that a being is conscious if there is something it is like to be that being, to use a phrase made famous by Thomas Nagel. Similarly, a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel—an associated quality of experience. These qualitative feels are also known as phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short. The problem of explaining these phenomenal qualities is just the problem of explaining consciousness. This is the really hard part of the mind–body problem”