Knowledge Tree
Relations (1)
related 2.58 — strongly supporting 5 facts
Qualia are defined as the qualitative feels that characterize conscious mental states, as noted in [1] and [2]. Furthermore, arguments regarding qualia often center on the difficulty of materialist accounts to explain the subjective experience of being in a specific mental state, as described in [3].
Facts (5)
Sources
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu 2 facts
referenceQualia arguments emphasize the impossibility for materialist accounts to properly incorporate the quality of the subjective experience of a mental state, described as the 'what it is like' to be in that state (Nagel 1974).
claimMany contemporary approaches to consciousness research prefer to distinguish between first-person and third-person perspectives rather than mental and material states to highlight the discrepancy between immediate conscious experiences (qualia) and their behavioral, neural, or biophysical descriptions.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 2 facts
claimDavid Chalmers defines phenomenal qualities, or "qualia," as the qualitative feels or associated qualities of experience that make a mental state conscious.
quote“We can say that a being is conscious if there is something it is like to be that being, to use a phrase made famous by Thomas Nagel. Similarly, a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel—an associated quality of experience. These qualitative feels are also known as phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short. The problem of explaining these phenomenal qualities is just the problem of explaining consciousness. This is the really hard part of the mind–body problem”
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimSome representationalists, such as Dretske (1995) and Lycan (1996), treat qualia as objective properties that external objects are represented as having, rather than as properties of mental states or representations.