mental states ↔ epiphenomenalism

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related 3.00 — strongly supporting 7 facts

Epiphenomenalism is a philosophical theory defined by its specific stance on the causal efficacy of mental states, asserting that they lack physical effects [1], [2], [3], and [4].

Facts (7)

Sources

Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Howard Robinson · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3 facts

claimA major objection to epiphenomenalism is that if mental states have no causal power, there is no evolutionary reason for them to have developed.

claimIf epiphenomenalism is true, mental states do not explain behavior, making it explanatorily redundant to postulate mental states for others when a physical explanation for their behavior exists.

claimEpiphenomenalism is considered counterintuitive because it contradicts the common observation that mental states, such as pain or visual experience, cause physical behaviors, such as crying or running away.

Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 3 facts

claimOverdetermination dualism is compatible with physical causal closure, similar to epiphenomenalism, but differs by allowing mental states to affect physical states.

perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that non-epiphenomenalist theories, such as physicalism and interactionism, face the same improbability issues as epiphenomenalism because they must posit specific two-way psychophysical laws or identity relations to explain correlations between physical and mental states.

claimEpiphenomenalism implies that mental states have no physical effects, which suggests that humans lack the ability to cause physical actions, rendering them passive spectators of their own lives rather than actors.

Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 fact

claimStrong reductionism leads to a monistic picture where mental states are either eliminated or considered epiphenomenal.