mental states ↔ Functionalism

Relations (1)

related 3.00 — strongly supporting 7 facts

Functionalism is a philosophical theory that defines mental states by their functional roles and causal relations rather than their physical composition, as established in [1], [2], and [3]. This relationship is further supported by the functionalist view that mental states emerge from organizational structures [4] and could potentially be realized by artificial systems that replicate these roles [5], [6], and [7].

Facts (7)

Sources

Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Consciousness and the Intermediate ... pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov PMC 2 facts

claimFunctionalist approaches to the mind prioritize a functional perspective, focusing on the roles and causal relations of mental states rather than their physical composition.

claimFunctionalist approaches to the mind prioritize a functional view of mental states.

Unknown source 2 facts

claimThe functionalist view of mental states asserts that consciousness emerges from the functional organization of a system, rather than from any specific physical substance or property.

claimFunctionalism is a theory in the philosophy of mind asserting that mental states are defined by their function or role as a mental state, rather than by their internal constitution.

[PDF] Consciousness, Embodiment, and Artificial Intelligence digitalcommons.ncf.edu New College of Florida 1 fact

claimThe functionalist view of mental states posits that conscious mental states supervene on specific organizational structures in the brain and their respective functional mechanisms.

A Functionalist Perspective on AI and Consciousness | by Ethan Shen medium.com Ethan Shen · Medium 1 fact

claimThe functionalist view of mental states aligns with the proposition that artificial intelligence systems could theoretically realize mental states if the systems can replicate the necessary functional roles.

The Evidence for Functionalism—On Intelligence, Consciousness ... medium.com Medium 1 fact

claimThe author of the article 'The Evidence for Functionalism—On Intelligence, Consciousness, and the End of Metaphysical Excuses' asserts that no one has provided evidence that mental states can exist independently of causal roles.