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Relations (1)
cross_type 0.90 — strongly supporting 9 facts
David Chalmers is fundamentally linked to the concept of phenomenal experience through his formulation of the 'hard problem of consciousness' [1], [2] and his use of the concept to define explanatory gaps [3] and hypothetical scenarios like 'zombie-twins' [4], [5], [6].
Facts (9)
Sources
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 8 facts
accountIn David Chalmers' hypothetical zombie-world, every person has a 'zombie clone' who behaves exactly like the original person but lacks any phenomenal experience or subjective awareness.
referenceDavid Chalmers's conceivability argument posits that it is impossible to distinguish "zombie" philosophers of mind from conscious individuals because their behavior is identical and it is impossible to know the internal state of a "zombie" who lacks phenomenal experience.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that the 'hard problem of consciousness' is not about tracing neuronal processes and their correlation with cognitive processes, but about explaining why physical activity is accompanied by phenomenal experience.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that because behavior can be explained in purely physical terms, it is possible for 'zombie-twins' to behave exactly like humans despite having no phenomenal experience.
claimDavid Chalmers defines second-order phenomenal judgments (DPJ) as judgments that relate to the existence, rather than the quality, of phenomenal experience.
claimDavid Chalmers does not appear to distinguish between the fact of incorrigible phenomenal experiencing (what it is like to be) and the supposed existence of 'the phenomenal' as an irreducible ontic category, according to observations by von Stillfried.
claimDavid Chalmers uses the concept of 'irreducibility' to define the explanatory gap between phenomenal experience (how it feels to be) and physical accounts of neuronal activity, cognition, and behavior.
perspectiveVon Stillfried argues that David Chalmers's concept of acquaintance solves the epistemological question of how one knows they have consciousness, but fails to solve the ontological question of why there is concordance between phenomenal experience and physical correlata or whether consciousness is explanatorily relevant.
David Chalmers on the meta-problem of consciousness selfawarepatterns.com 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers coined the term 'hard problem of consciousness' to describe the intractably difficult issue of how and why phenomenal experience arises from a physical system.