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Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2 facts
claimThe 'Intrinsic Nature Argument' for panpsychism has historical roots in the works of Leibniz, Schopenhauer, Bertrand Russell (1927), and Alfred North Whitehead (1933 [1967]), and is supported by contemporary philosophers including T.L.S. Sprigge (1999), Galen Strawson (2003), and Philip Goff (2017).
perspectivePhilip Goff (2006, 2017) argues that panpsychists may be unable to provide a wholly intelligible explanation for how macro-level consciousness emerges from micro-level consciousness, which challenges Galen Strawson's claim that panpsychism avoids radical emergence.
Panpsychism: Conscious Rocks and Socks - Free Thinking Ministries freethinkingministries.com Dr. Tim Stratton · FreeThinking Ministries 1 fact
claimGalen Strawson is a prominent advocate for the panpsychist views held by Philip Goff.
Critique of Panpsychism: Philosophical Coherence and Scientific ... thequran.love Zia H Shah MD · The Muslim Times 1 fact
perspectiveGalen Strawson and Philip Goff argue that the seeming strangeness of panpsychism is not a decisive strike against it, noting that science has previously accepted counterintuitive ideas like relativity and quantum mechanics.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 fact
claimThe intrinsic nature argument for panpsychism is defended by philosophers including Michael Lockwood Sprigge (1999), Galen Strawson (2003), and Philip Goff (2017).
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 1 fact
claimThomas Nagel, Galen Strawson, Philip Goff, and David Chalmers have revived interest in panpsychism and neutral monism in recent decades.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 1 fact
claimIn recent decades, dual-aspect monism has gained wider recognition as a distinct non-physicalist theory due to defenses by philosophers including David Chalmers (1995, 1996, 2003, 2013, 2016), William Seager (1995, 2010), Daniel Stoljar (2001), Galen Strawson (2006, 2016), and Philip Goff (2017).