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related 2.32 — strongly supporting 4 facts
Qualia and qualitative consciousness are synonymous terms used interchangeably in philosophical discourse to describe the 'what it is like' aspect of experience, as evidenced by their shared roles in the 'zombie' argument [1] and the definitions provided by philosophers like Kriegel [2]. Both concepts are central to debates regarding the causal status of consciousness [3] and the fundamental nature of subjective experience [4].
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Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu 3 facts
referenceArguments alleging that certain forms of consciousness lack causal status have been raised by Thomas Huxley (1874), Frank Jackson (1982), and David Chalmers (1996) regarding qualia and qualitative consciousness, and by Max Velmans (1991) regarding meta-mental consciousness.
claimThe 'zombie' argument posits that beings whose behavior, functional organization, and physical structure are identical to normal human agents but who lack qualia or qualitative consciousness are logically possible.
perspectiveSome philosophers, such as Nagel (1974) and Chalmers (1996), argue that qualitative consciousness—the 'what it is like' aspect—is philosophically and scientifically central, and that organisms lacking such qualia may only be conscious in a loose or non-literal sense.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 1 fact
claimUriah Kriegel defines the 'qualitative component of consciousness' as the experienced character of consciousness, such as the 'redness of red' or the 'painfulness of pain,' which is often termed 'qualia' or 'phenomenal character' in philosophical literature.