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cross_type 13.00 — strongly supporting 13 facts
David Chalmers explores the nature of physical reality through his work on Russellian Monism, proposing that it possesses intrinsic properties that may be phenomenal in nature [1], [2], [3]. He further investigates the relationship between consciousness and physical reality by considering whether the latter is derivative of experience [4], [5] or requires bridging principles to connect the two domains [6].
Facts (13)
Sources
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 9 facts
claimDavid Chalmers proposes that a combination of experimental study, phenomenological investigation, and philosophical analysis will lead to systematic principles bridging the domains of consciousness and physical reality, eventually revealing underlying fundamental laws.
claimDavid Chalmers interprets Colin McGinn's concept of a 'hidden dimension' of physical reality as a requirement to postulate something new and fundamental beyond what is empirically adequate.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers suggests that viewing a new dimension as a Russellian 'realizing' property supports the idea of turning the 'hard problem' of consciousness 'upside down,' where physical reality is derivative of underlying (proto)experiences.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that the view that experience is fundamental to physical reality is not forced by quantum mechanics, as there are ways to interpret quantum mechanics while maintaining that fundamental physical reality has an objective existence.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers suggests that the best path to an integrated view of nature is the Russellian picture where (proto)experiential properties constitute the intrinsic nature of physical reality.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers argues that if fundamental physical reality lacks objective existence, the only logical interpretation is a form of idealism where physical reality exists solely within experience.
claimDavid Chalmers proposes a Russellian view where a pervasive intrinsic property of physical reality exists, which carries the structure and dynamics of physical theory but is not directly revealed by empirical investigation, enabling the existence of consciousness.
claimDavid Chalmers notes that the idea of "pure consciousness" is appealing in a way similar to the Russellian idea of a physical world without intrinsic qualities, noting that both ideas are appealing despite or because of their flirtation with incoherence.
claimDavid Chalmers defines epiphenomenalism as the view that consciousness has no effect on the physical world.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 4 facts
claimDavid Chalmers suggests bypassing skeptical problems by giving us the physical world for free, though this leaves the essential character of the physical world and its relation to experience unexplained.
claimDavid Chalmers suggests that the intrinsic properties of the physical world are themselves phenomenal properties, an interpretation derived from the relationship between percepts and intrinsic essence in Russellian Monism.
claimDavid Chalmers did not initially consider the possibility of the physical world supervening on the phenomenal in his 1995 and 2010 works, and therefore did not offer solutions for it.
accountDavid Chalmers, as a former physicalist, initially took the existence of the physical world for granted and constructed his arguments to convince himself of the irreducibility of consciousness to the physical rather than to address skepticism.