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Relations (1)
cross_type 2.58 — strongly supporting 5 facts
Elizabeth Fricker is a prominent philosopher who has extensively researched and published on the concept of testimony, as evidenced by her works 'Testimony: Knowing Through Being Told' [1] and 'Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy' [2]. She further explores the nature of testimony through her academic debates [3] and her theoretical claims regarding the relationship between testimony and assertion {fact:4, fact:5}.
Facts (5)
Sources
Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 4 facts
claimElizabeth Fricker argues that when a hearer forms a belief based on a teller's testimony, the hearer typically holds a higher-order belief that the teller would not assert or vouch for the proposition unless the teller knew it to be true.
referenceElizabeth Fricker published 'Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy' in the 2006 collection edited by Lackey and Sosa.
referenceElizabeth Fricker authored 'Testimony: Knowing Through Being Told', published in the 'Handbook of Epistemology' edited by I. Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen, and J. Wolenski in 2004.
referenceElizabeth Fricker published 'Varieties of Anti-Reductionism About Testimony—A Reply to Goldberg and Henderson' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 2006.
Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimElizabeth Fricker and Ernest Sosa defend the position that testimony should be identified with assertion, meaning one testifies that a proposition is true if and only if one asserts that the proposition is true.