Knowledge Tree
Relations (1)
related 2.32 — strongly supporting 4 facts
The Central Intelligence Agency is a constituent member of the Intelligence Community as identified in [1], and it holds the authority to coordinate relationships between the various elements of that community per [2]. Furthermore, the agency's role in coordinating intelligence activities is a central subject of evaluation regarding the overall effectiveness of the Intelligence Community, as noted in [3] and [4].
Facts (4)
Sources
The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community-An Historical ... govinfo.gov 2 facts
claimThe Second Hoover Commission identified the NSC, CIA, NSA, FBI, Department of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Atomic Energy Commission as members of the U.S. intelligence community in 1955.
referenceThe National Security Council accepted the basic findings of the 1949 Dulles-Jackson-Correa report, which concluded that the CIA was not coordinating intelligence activities in the government, correlation and evaluation functions were not well organized, other members of the Intelligence Community were not fully included in the estimates process, and the DCI lacked sufficient day-to-day contact with the work of the CIA.
United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships everycrsreport.com 2 facts
referenceExecutive Order 12333, titled 'United States Intelligence Activities,' grants the Central Intelligence Agency the authority to coordinate the implementation of intelligence and counterintelligence relationships between elements of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments or international organizations, under the direction and guidance of the Director of National Intelligence.
referenceThe Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction identified four primary factors for the U.S. Intelligence Community's failure regarding the source known as 'Curveball': (1) reliance on a single source despite indications of unreliability, (2) senior CIA management ignoring warnings from Directorate of Operations officers, (3) the Defense Intelligence Agency's failure to validate the reporting, and (4) analysts' inability to question assumptions about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program.