physical properties ↔ consciousness

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The relationship between consciousness and physical properties is defined by the philosophical debate over their irreducibility, as seen in the 'hard problem of consciousness' [1] and the explanatory gap [2]. Various theories, including panpsychism [3], dual-aspect monism [4], and Russellian monism [5], attempt to reconcile these concepts by examining whether consciousness is fundamental or supervenes upon physical properties {fact:4, fact:7, fact:8}.

Facts (10)

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The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com Springer 5 facts

claimThe arguments regarding the irreducibility of consciousness postulate an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal accounts, implying an ontological distinction between phenomenal and physical properties.

claimA non-reductive naturalistic theory of consciousness may propose natural supervenience of phenomenal properties on physical properties, provided it incorporates additional natural principles not found in physical law.

claimDavid Chalmers argues that because there is a subjective experience of being, consciousness cannot be explained solely in terms of physical properties and must be based on an irreducible fundamental non-physical ontic category.

claimThe core assumption of David Chalmers's 'hard problem of consciousness' is the irreducibility of consciousness to physical properties.

claimRussellian monism is not affected by the conceivability argument or the knowledge argument, and it supports a naturalist view on consciousness while integrating phenomenal and physical properties.

Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2 facts

claimNeutral monism, panpsychism, and dualism all share the premise that consciousness is as basic as, or more basic than, physical properties.

claimA dual-aspect view of consciousness holds that there is one basic underlying substance that possesses both physical and phenomenal properties.

Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 fact

referenceDavid Chalmers' 1996 work on 'consciousness and information' classifies mental and physical properties as reducible to a psychophysically neutral domain.

Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 1 fact

referenceIn the book 'Mortal Questions' (1979), Thomas Nagel argues that panpsychism follows from four premises: (P1) everything that exists is material, (P2) consciousness is irreducible to lower-level physical properties, (P3) consciousness exists, and (P4) higher-order properties of matter can be reduced to lower-level properties.

Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 1 fact

claimDual-aspect monism posits that everything, including particles, possesses both a physical and a (proto)mental aspect because (proto)consciousness is the intrinsic nature of physical properties, which physics describes only as structural or relational.