physical properties ↔ panpsychism

Relations (1)

related 0.70 — strongly supporting 5 facts

Panpsychism is related to physical properties because it is often defined by the claim that matter possesses both physical and mental properties [1], [2], and it posits that consciousness cannot be reduced to basic physical properties [3], [4].

Facts (5)

Sources

Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2 facts

claimNeutral monism, panpsychism, and dualism all share the premise that consciousness is as basic as, or more basic than, physical properties.

claimDual aspect theory, neutral monism, and panpsychism hold that phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to basic physical properties, but may reduce to a more basic substance that possesses both physical and phenomenal properties.

Consciousness, Physicalism, and Panpsychism - R Discovery discovery.researcher.life Researcher.life 1 fact

claimNeutral monism, as analyzed in the context of William James's philosophy, does not provide complete independence of a substance from mental and physical properties, which may lead the theory toward panpsychism unless it is an idealistic variety.

Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 1 fact

referenceIn the book 'Mortal Questions' (1979), Thomas Nagel argues that panpsychism follows from four premises: (P1) everything that exists is material, (P2) consciousness is irreducible to lower-level physical properties, (P3) consciousness exists, and (P4) higher-order properties of matter can be reduced to lower-level properties.

Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 fact

claimThomas Nagel's argument for panpsychism relies on four premises: Material Composition (living organisms are complex material systems with no immaterial parts), Realism (mental states are genuine properties of living organisms), No Radical Emergence (all properties of a complex organism are intelligibly derived from the properties of its parts), and Non-Reductionism (mental states are not intelligibly derived from physical properties alone).